Journal of Applied Farm Economics
Volume 3

Issue 2

Article 4

2020

Hemp Production Network Effects: Are Producers Tipped Toward
Suboptimal Varietal Selection by Their Neighbors?
Tanner McCarty
Utah State University, tanner.mccarty@usu.edu

Jeffrey Young
Murray State University, jyoung6@murraystate.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/jafe
Part of the Agricultural Economics Commons, Behavioral Economics Commons, Industrial
Organization Commons, and the Regional Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
McCarty, Tanner and Young, Jeffrey (2020) "Hemp Production Network Effects: Are Producers Tipped
Toward Suboptimal Varietal Selection by Their Neighbors?," Journal of Applied Farm Economics: Vol. 3 :
Iss. 2, Article 4.
DOI: 10.7771/2331-9151.1047
Available at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/jafe/vol3/iss2/4

This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries.
Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for additional information.
This is an Open Access journal. This means that it uses a funding model that does not charge readers or their
institutions for access. Readers may freely read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of
articles. This journal is covered under the CC BY-NC-ND license.

Journal of Applied Farm Economics 3, no. 2 (Fall 2020)

Hemp Production Network Effects: Are Producers Tipped Toward
Suboptimal Varietal Selection by Their Neighbors?
Tanner McCarty (Utah State University) and Jeffrey Young (Murray State University)

ABSTRACT

KEYWORDS

The 2018 farm bill removed industrial hemp from the Schedule 1 Controlled Substance
List. In response, states scrambled to enact hemp legislation. Some hemp flower producers report their hemp fields were cross-pollinated by a neighbor growing a different
hemp cultivar. For hemp flower crops, cross-pollination reduces cannabinoid concentration levels within the flower; these concentration levels dictate flower price. We show
that in a repeated game, once a sufficiently large percentage of growers decide to plant
hemp fiber/seed crops, cross-pollination forces flower growers to convert to fiber/seed
to avoid the negative network externality. Over time, a stable, suboptimal Nash equilibrium of reduced flower production results. The most important factor driving this tip
to reduced flower production is pollen transmission rates between fields. This factor can
be effectively reduced through either an auction-style quota system directed at seed and
fiber cultivars or intertemporal zoning laws that dictate when a particular cultivar can
be planted. As applications for hemp growing licenses swell, cross-pollination between
farmers becomes increasingly likely. If left unchecked by policy, farm-level income and
rural economic development will be suppressed.

hemp, cross-pollination,
network effects,
tipping points, negative
externalities

feminized unpollinated hemp crop. CBD is a high-
value, nonintoxicating cannabis compound used
in a host of therapeutic and beauty products. The
CBD market is one of the fastest-growing markets
in the United States. In 2018, the market value of
CBD-containing products was estimated between
$0.6 and $2 billion, and it is expected to grow to
$15 billion by 2025 (Azer et al., 2019).
A field of feminized CBD hemp plants can be
inadvertently pollinated from fiber hemp, grain
hemp, nonfeminized CBD hemp, or even marijuana (Bourque, 2019; DeDecker, 2019). Before
the 2018 farm bill, farmers who grew CBD hemp
were unaffected by cross-
pollination since they
had no neighbors cultivating non-CBD hemp (e.g.,
fiber or seed). Hemp fields, regardless of the type
of hemp grown, were geographically removed
from the next; only research plots were legal. Since
then, the number of industrial hemp producers
has significantly increased. Hemp CBD growers
claim cross-
pollination from neighbors growing
cultivars for fiber or seed production destroys the
value of their flower crop. A field experiment by

INTRODUCTION
The 2018 farm bill removed industrial hemp
(Cannabis sativa L.) from the Schedule 1 Controlled Substance List and reclassified it as an
agricultural commodity. This federal legalization
sparked public and private interest in hemp’s
potential to augment farmers’ incomes and drive
rural development in a time of low commodity
prices and restricted market access for agricultural producers (Kentucky Department of Agriculture, 2018; Place, 2019a, 2019b). Expected hemp
returns vary significantly based on the chosen cultivar. Floral hemp leads to the highest expected
return, as opposed to seed or fiber. Flower cultivars contain high concentrations of cannabidiol
(CBD), which is extracted postharvest from the
flower. Budgets for CBD production estimate one
ton of dried flower, with a 10% CBD concentration, is worth between $10,000 to $70,000 (Cui
& Smith, 2019; Mark & Shepherd, 2019; Place,
2019a, 2019b). These prices are the result of the
high CBD concentrations, achieved only from
30
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Meier and Mediavilla (1998) found pollination
to reduce CBD concentration levels by more than
50%. As growers continue to enter the hemp market, a CBD grower gains neighbors growing non-
CBD hemp. As this concentration of non-CBD
hemp g rowers increases, the likelihood of cross-
pollination approaches certainty.
In markets where positive/negative externalities are incurred through social networks, existing
equilibriums can be unstable and tip to a dramatically new state once a specific externality threshold is passed (Gladwell, 2006; Jackson & Yariv,
2006, 2007). For instance, if each CBD grower
best responds given the conditions of the previous
period, when the cross-pollination risk crosses a
threshold, they will switch to growing non-CBD
hemp. This, in turn affects their neighbors growing CBD, which will then influence those neighbors’ production decision to switch from CBD to
non-CBD alternatives. Eventually, a large proportion of the population could be exposed to a large
negative-network externality, which would force
all/most producers to grow non-CBD hemp. Without the externality, most growers would choose to
grow the more profitable alternative, CBD. This
means additional hemp licensing could lead to a
suboptimal Nash equilibrium where higher valued
CBD crops would no longer be viable due to the
increased risk of cross-pollination from non-CBD
crops.
The problem is, no one knows under what conditions the industrial hemp market would tip to
reduced CBD production, and what the severity
of the tip would be. The failure to prevent this tip
could result in the loss and/or reduced viability
of a multibillion-dollar agricultural industry. On
the other hand, introducing unneeded legislation
could raise the cost of hemp production. This
paper offers two primary contributions to addressing this problem. First, we identify the marginal
impact that hemp market primitives (pollen transmission rate, economic attractiveness of either
crop and network structure) has in pushing the
industrial hemp market toward a tip to the suboptimal, reduced-CBD Nash equilibrium. Second,
we identify policies capable of targeting the hemp
market primitives that have the largest impact on
tipping the industry. Using the general framework
developed by Jackson and Yariv (2006), we examine hemp varietal selection through the lens of

negative network externalities and decision making within social networks.
Hemp markets are complex. The number of
each grower’s neighbors, their decisions, and
the transmission rate of pollen from neighboring fields affects each grower’s payoff. The social
network economics literature examines how
an individual agent’s payoff is affected by their
neighbor’s actions. A subset of the social network
literature, first explored by Gladwell (2006),
examines how the change of actions by a small
subgroup can disproportionately affect the rest of
the population’s outcomes. The proposition that a
change in the actions of several agents can have a
dramatic effect on the final equilibrium of actions
followed by an entire population is referred to as
tipping. The key takeaway in the tipping literature is that a change in action by a sufficiently
high proportion of the population can result in
a cascading response, where the rest of the population responds by changing their own actions.
Thus, this social network literature is especially
applicable to industrial hemp.
Jackson and Yariv (2006) developed a generalized
model capable of accommodating these network
externalities, tipping, and agents’ best response to
neighbor’s actions. They use this model to examine how changes in key primitives relative to social
networks affect the threshold at which tipping to
a new action occurs and how much of the population subsequently adopts the new action after
a tip. We apply their general model to a grower’s
decision to grow CBD or non-CBD hemp. Specifically, we characterize how economic and network
factors affect hemp growers’ expected returns for
CBD and non-CBD. We then test under what conditions these hemp markets tip to new equilibriums
of decreased CBD production. We subsequently
identify the most important influencers of tips and
discuss policy tools to shape them.

MODEL
Assume that a finite set of hemp growers can choose
one of two actions: action A, grow CBD hemp, or
action B, grow non-CBD hemp. The action each
grower chooses affects the payout function of his/
her neighbors through the network. Each individual grower i has a number of direct neighbors
of a degree di. The percentage of individuals within
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this subset that have d neighbors is represented as
d max
P(d) ≥ 0, for d =1, 2, … , dmax, and / d =1 P(d) =1 ,
where P(d) represents the percentage of the population with d neighbors.
First consider action A, the default choice due
to its higher expected profit. The payout grower i
receives from growing crop A is a function of the
expected revenue, riA, minus operating cost from
choosing A, wiA, minus the expected externality
cost incurred through cross-pollination, eiAg(di)mi
(where eiA is the penalty to revenue due to reduced
CBD concentrations if cross-pollination occurs).
The term g(di)mi denotes the probability of cross-
pollination. Cross-
pollination becomes increasingly likely as the fraction of grower i’s neighbors
choosing to grow B, mi, increases. The number
of neighbors that farmer i has, di, also increases
the probability of cross-pollination. Thus both mi
and di affect how likely grower i is to experiencing externality cost eiA if they choose A. Finally, a
grower evaluates these expected prices, costs, and
externalities through their own risk aversion characteristics leading to their own utility of crop A,
UiA. Grower i’s payoff for choosing to grow crop
A, ViA, takes the form:
ViA = U iA (riA − w iA − e iA g (d i) m i )

(1)

The payoff to grower i for cultivating B is independent of what their neighbors choose, since action
B is unaffected by pollination. Grower i’s payoff
for choosing B depends only on B’s revenue, riB,
the operating cost, wiB, and how their risk aversion
shape their utility, UiB. Grower i’s payoff for action
B, ViB is defined as:
ViB = U iB (riB − w iB)

(2)

A grower will switch from action A to B once he
perceived benefits of B, BiB outweigh the costs of
B, CiB. We rearrange terms to make the costs of
choosing B equal to the value grower i places on
the forgone private profit from choosing A, riA
minus the private profit of choosing B, riB:
C iB = U (r iB − w iB)

(3)

This means the benefit of choosing B is the expected
value of the externality cost that would have been
incurred had the grower chosen A. Rearranging
these terms allows us to isolate the effect of the
externality size and probability on individual decision making.

B iB = U (e iA g (d i) m i)

(4)

Finally, a grower currently producing CBD hemp
will switch to non-CBD hemp once their benefits
outweigh their costs of doing so. This occurs when:
B
R i = C iB ≥ 1
iB

(5)

Equation (5) effectively captures a grower’s decision to continue growing CBD or switch to non-
CBD. Changes in prices, costs, or the structure of g
will push individual CBD growers toward or away
from non-CBD production, which in turn affects
their neighbors through the network externality
they experience. Due to the network’s interconnectedness, changes by individuals in the network
may dramatically shift the portfolio of hemp production from CBD to non-CBD alternatives.
Game Setup

At time t = 0, a percentage of the growers within
the population of all hemp growers randomly
select B, X0. At each time point, t > 0 each grower
responds to the distribution of other growers who
chose B in period t -1. We assume that growers
who voluntarily chose B never switch back; this
ensures a stable “steady state” equilibrium result
over time. This assumption greatly simplifies the
problem with little loss in generality. If a grower
decides to switch to B to avoid a negative externality for relatively low levels of di and mi, they would
not switch back at later periods when these levels
are higher. Depending on market characteristics
and the initial size of X0, the state variable Xt (percentage of growers within the network who have
adopted B at time t) will either rise or fall over
time until it reaches a steady state, X. Once in the
steady state, no agent has any incentive to switch
states. The initial state X0 enters into (5) through
its implicit effect on mi; more initial adopters of B
within the population (X0) means that individual
farmers will, on average, have a higher value of mi.
One of three possibilities results from the initial value of X0. First, low levels of X0 cause a
decrease in the percentage of B adopters over time
(Xt + 1 < Xt), and the percentage of B adopters falls
until the steady state adopter percentage, X < X 0 .
Second, high levels of X0 trigger a tip (Xt + 1 > Xt),
and the percentage of B adopters rapidly increases
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until a new equilibrium occurs where X > X 0 . Third,
the current percentage of B adopters is maintained
over time (Xt + 1 = Xt), and X = X0 . This point is of
particular importance as it triggers the tip to a new
steady state. This level of X0 that maintains balance
is referred to as the tipping point. Values above
cause an increase to a new higher steady state and
values below drive decreased B adoption. This tipping point is denoted X *0 . In the context of hemp
production, passing the tipping point is problematic
since the tip results from the negative externality
costs that non-CBD producers impose on CBD producers. The result is a suboptimal Nash equilibrium.

PARAMETER ASSUMPTIONS
AND NETWORK STRUCTURE
The following subsections explain the empirics
associated with Equation (5) and the structure of
the network through which those individual decisions permeate.
Costs of Switching to Non-CBD Hemp

As previously mentioned, the costs of switching to
non-CBD hemp production is the utility grower i
receives from private profit of growing CBD minus
the private profit to growing non-CBD. CBD hemp
farming is an enterprise of relatively high risk
and potential returns, when compared with fiber
or grain hemp production (Hanchar, 2019). For
example, fiber hemp revenues are estimated to be
$750–$800 per acre, which appears rather small
when compared to the expected $10,000–$70,000
per acre for CBD production (Hanchar, 2019; Mark
& Shepherd, 2019). The range of CBD revenue is so
large due to differences in CBD prices, CBD concentration levels within the plant, and yield per acre
experienced in different locations at different times.
Fiber hemp operating cost is estimated to be
$390 per acre. The selling price of feminized clones
necessary for achieving high CBD concentration
range between $4 and $10 per individual plant,
with more than a thousand planted on a single
acre (Kim & Mahlberg, 1997; Meier & Mediavilla, 1998; Small & Naraine, 2016). Combined
with high labor requirements, these costs contribute to an estimated yearly operating cost of
around $10,000–$15,000 per acre (Hanchar,
2019; Place, 2019a, 2019b; Schaneman, 2019).

CBD hemp is risky to grow; various stresses such
as drought, temperature, and altitude can cause
THC levels within a plant to spike (Gerlach,
2019; Place, 2019a, 2019b). If a CBD crop tests at
more than 0.3% THC content, it is destroyed by
drug enforcement agencies (Gerlach, 2019; Place,
2019a, 2019b). These differences in risk-
return
profiles imply that more risk-averse hemp growers will gravitate toward producing grain or fiber,
while the less risk-averse hemp growers will gravitate toward the more profitable CBD production.
The exact level of CiB varies by grower.
Benefits of Switching to Non-CBD

As mentioned in the previous section, the benefit of
switching to non-CBD is the utility gained from the
avoided damage from cross-pollination achieved
by not growing CBD, U(eiAg(di)mi). Parameter eiA
denotes the damage itself and g(di)mi denotes the
probability of cross-pollination. Parameter g maps
the effect of di onto the expectation of externality
damage. We specify g (d i) = ad ib where b approximates how contagious an additional neighbor
growing fiber is for cross-pollination (the marginal
transmission rate). For this analysis we assume
0 ≤ b ≤ 1. This means that increases in both the total
number of grower i’s neighbors and the fraction
of neighbors within a given grower i’s network
choosing B increase the relative attractiveness of
choosing non-CBD for grower i. This assumption
captures the empirical effect cross-pollination has
on CBD producers. The specification of b also
ensures that there is a diminishing effect of each
additional neighbor on the probability of cross-
pollination. We use a as a scalar to constrain the
probability of cross-
pollination between 0 and
100%. Specifically, we rescaled a to ensure 100%
of cross-
pollination when m0 = 1 and 0% when
m0 = 0, for the highest level of d considered in
this analysis, dmax = 20. The exact level of BiB is
affected by current CBD prices, CBD crop yields,
the reduction in CBD concentration levels incurred
through cross-pollination, and grower’s valuation
of risk. This means BiB varies by grower.
Cost-Benefit Ratios

Differences in benefits and costs across growers
means there is a distribution of possible cost-benefit
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B iB

ratios of adopting non-CBD, C = R within a social
network. We follow Jackson and Yariv (2006) by
modeling this distribution of R to be uniformly
distributed on the interval 0 to Rmax. We explore
Rmax levels on uniform distributions between 0 to
Rmax = 10 and uniform distributions between 0
and Rmax = 40.
iB

Structure of the Underlying Network

We follow the assumptions made by Jackson and
Yariv (2006) and assume that growers interact with
one another through a network with a “scale-free
structure,” specifically the pdf of having d neighbors, f (d) = d1 . This distributional assumption for
neighbor degree is an appropriate characterization
of the industrial hemp networks. A few areas of
the United States have many individuals growing
hemp in a small area. Many areas of the United
States have a limited number of individuals growing hemp in a large area. Furthermore, this modeling assumption is consistent with many other
social network applications such as the World
Wide Web and epidemiology. Powers associated
with these types of distributions often provide the
best approximation of the network when they fall
between 2 and 3 (Newman, 2002).
The average degree
of neighbors within the
/ dP (d)
population is d, d = a / (P (d)) k. The percentage of B
adopters in a network at time t evolves following
the formula in Equation 61:
2 .5

d

d

X t = 1− /
d

dP (d)
1
min ;1,
Rmax g ^dh X t −1 E
d

(6)

RESULTS

to non-CBD. In the following section, we quantitatively examine the impact of changes in key market primitives on the market.
Recall that Equation (5) maps the individual
decision of a hemp grower to continue growing CBD or switch to non-CBD conditional on
actions by grower i’s neighbors. The actions taken
by grower i this period subsequently affect the
actions of their neighbors next period through
their network. Taking the first order conditions of
each variable in Equation (5), we recover the effect
that each variable has on a grower’s decision to
grow CBD or non-CBD hemp. The results of these
comparative statics are included in Table 1.
The results suggest that increases to private profit
associated with growing CBD, riA, make a change
to non-CBD less attractive, whereas increases in
private profit to non-CBD make it more attractive.
Put differently, if non-CBD production increases
expected profitability relative to CBD production,
more growers will switch to non-CBD. This outcome is expected. The larger the size of the network externality, ei, the more attractive non-CBD
becomes. In other words, the grower would have
more incentive to switch to non-CBD production
if cross-pollination penalized CBD levels by 60%
than if it penalized CBD levels by 30%. This result
reinforces the importance of genetics in selecting
CBD cultivars. Some strains of CBD plants may be
less affected by cross-pollination than others.
A grower producing CBD will be incentivized
to switch to non-CBD as the percentage of their
neighbors growing non-
CBD hemp, mi increases.
As the percentage of neighbors growing non-CBD
increases, a grower will become increasingly likely
to get their CBD crop cross-pollinated as they are
effectively surrounded on more sides by neighbors

Individual Decision Making

Due to the heterogeneity in a grower’s perceived
costs and benefits to switching to non-CBD and
the heterogeneity in the number of neighbors a
grower has, the exact threshold for individual conversion to choose non-CBD varies by farmer. From
a policy perspective, the individual decision is less
important than the market as a whole. However,
to understand the market we must first understand
what drives individual decisions. In this section,
we focus results on qualitative considerations that
affect all individual growers’ decisions to switch

Table 1. Change in grower i’s benefit cost ratio, R,
of switching from CBD to non-CBD production
in response to changes in variables
2R
2r iA < 0

2R
2r iB > 0

2R
>0
2d i

2R
2g > 0

2R
>0
2m i

2R
2ei > 0
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who could cross-pollinate them. The total number
of neighbors, di, matters as well. Even if a grower is
surrounded by the same acreage of neighbors growing non-CBD, cross-pollination is more likely if
they have multiple small neighbors growing it than
if one large neighbor is; pollination can only occur
over a specific time interval. If a CBD grower plants
at a sufficiently different time than their neighbor
growing non-CBD hemp, then cross-pollination is
less likely. The probability that at least one neighbor
plants non-CBD at a problematic time increases as
more neighbors are introduced (the supply of available land is assumed to be fixed).
Finally, the strength of g affects farmers’ decisions to grow non-CBD. Put differently, g effectively
amplifies the effect that having more neighbors
and having a higher percentage of neighbors has
on the probability of being cross-pollinated. If g
becomes stronger from something like the average distance between neighbors decreasing, then
growers will be increasingly incentivized to switch
to non-CBD production.
Market Dynamics

In this section, we examine tipping thresholds
and the resulting steady state under a range of
key market primitives. These primitives include b
values between 0 and 1, maximum degrees within
a scale-free network, dmax, between 5 and 20, and
the uniform distribution modeling benefit-
cost
ratios occurring between 0 and 10, and 0 and
40. Changing each of these primitives affects the
percentage of initial adopters that cause a tip to
increased non-
CBD hemp production and the
level of non-CBD hemp production that occurs
after the tip. The following sections explain what
each comparative static captures, why it was conducted, and the impact that changing it has on
tipping points and the resulting steady state.
Transmission of Pollen

Recall that g = ad bm0 denotes the probability that
cross-pollination occurs. We rescaled a to ensure
100% of cross-
pollination when X0 = 1.0 for
the highest level of d considered in this analysis, dmax = 20, and conditional on what b is,
a= 201 . Specifying the problem in this way allows
us to approximate how contagious an additional
b

neighbor growing fiber is for cross-
pollination
(marginal transmission rate). The marginal transmission rate denotes how quickly one more neighbor increases the probability of cross-pollination.
Exploring various transmission rates matters
because there is currently only limited evidence on
transmission rates for cross-pollination between
fields. If pollen is highly transmittable and pollinates the majority of a neighbor’s field, then a
b closer to 0 is appropriate. If, however, pollen
is less transmittable and/or only pollinates small
pockets of a neighbor’s field, then a b closer to
1.0 is appropriate. Values of b should not exceed
1.0, for this would imply an increasing marginal
pollen transmission rate. Under baseline assumptions and 50% of the population having adopted
fiber (X0 = 0.50), going from zero to one neighbors
changes the probability of cross-pollination from
0 to 50% when b = 0, and 0 to 2.5% when b = 1.0.
In both specifications, the probability of cross-
pollination is 100% when d = 20 and X0 = 100%.
Figure 1 displays the impact of pollen’s marginal
transmission rate, b, on tipping dynamics within a
hemp network. Different lines denote different b
levels. Recall that b = 0 implies high pollination
transmission between fields, and b = 1.0 implies
lower transmission between fields. X0 denotes
the percentage of all growers within the network
who have adopted non-CBD crops at time 0. X1
denotes the percentage of all growers within the
network who have adopted non-CBD crops the
following period. These curves are compared with
a 45-degree line to illustrate if a trend either dies
out or causes a tip to a new steady state over time.
Going from left to right on the horizontal access,
the first place the b curve intersects the 45-degree
line is the tipping point. For a given curve, this percentage of initial adoption leads to the exact same
amount of adopters the following period, X0 = X1.
If X0 is greater than this, a tip occurs and X1 > X0
which will continue until the curve intersects
the 45-degree line a second time in which a new
steady state is realized where once again X0 = X1
For example, our baseline assumption of b = 0.50
tips at X *0 = 22% and a moves to steady state of
X = 75% after a tip occurs. Levels of X0 higher
than 75 percent will decrease back to the steady
state of X = 75%.
The key takeaway is that transmission rate matters a great deal for both whether the hemp market
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Figure 1. The impact of transmission rates on the tipping point and steady state of
an industrial hemp network.

tips to non-CBD production, and if it does tip,
what percentage of it grows non-CBD. This means
that supporting agronomic research to accurately
estimate transmission rates is paramount. It also
highlights some potentially strong policy prescriptions. Finding a way to shift b from 0.50 to 0.75
is enough to go from a tipping point of roughly
X *0 = 22% and a steady state of X = 75% of hemp
crops being non-CBD to one where a tip is impossible. While policy makers cannot change the
agronomics, they can affect b through the mandate of barriers such as tree rows, or intertemporally spacing when growers are allowed to plant
various cultivars, which would keep reproductive
maturity times staggered, therefore reducing transmission rates.
Degree of Neighbors

Degree captures the underlying structure of a
given network. We assume a scale-free network
where the probability density of having d neighbors is d–2.5. This captures the empirical nature
of this emerging hemp industry. A few regions of
the United States have many individuals growing
hemp in a small area. Many areas of the United
States have a select number of individuals growing

hemp in a large area. While this network structure
that models central production hubs makes sense,
we do not know what the maximum amount of
neighbors, dmax, within a network is possible due
to a lack of agronomic data quantifying pollen
travel distance. A neighbor only counts as a neighbor if their crop is close enough to cross-pollinate
another grower’s crop. If pollination only can
occur from adjacent fields, then a maximum of
5 neighbors in a network is reasonable. If pollination can travel farther distances, then a degree of
20 or more would be more appropriate to assume.
Additionally, dmax is a moving target in both
geography and time. Some regions in the United
States grow more hemp than others. As additional
farmers enter the hemp market, both dmax within
a network and the expected degree for individual
agents will increase over time.
Figure 2 captures the effect of network structure
on tipping points and resulting steady states. Like
Figure 1, X0 denotes the percentage of all growers
within the network who have adopted non-CBD
crops at time 0. X1 denotes the percentage of all
growers within the network who have adopted
non-CBD crops the following period. The curves
denote different maximum values possible for
degree of neighbors within a scale-free network.
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Figure 2. Tipping points versus neighbor degrees.

For example, dmax = 5 means a scale-free network
with 1–5 neighbors possible and dmax = 10 means
a scale-free network with 1–10 neighbors possible.
Unsurprisingly, increasing the amount of possible total neighbors within a network reduces the
tipping point threshold and increases the resulting steady state after a tip. More surprising is its
limited effect. Two potential explanations exist
for this. The first is that under baseline assumptions of b = 0.5 transmission rates are fairly high
for one additional farmer. For instance, if 50% of
the population has already adopted the non-CBD
crop, changing from a degree of 0 to 1 neighbor
increases the probability of cross-pollination from
0% to 22%. Going from 4 neighbors to 5 in this
situation increases cross-
pollination from 45%
to 50%. This diminishing effect means that each
neighbor added to an individual grower’s circle is
less important than the one before. When transmission rates are lower (b is higher), dmax has a
larger effect. The second reason for this is due to
the scale-
free network assumption. Higher dmax
values have a smaller effect on the actual expected
value degree. Maximum values within scale-free
networks are unlikely, so increasing that maximum value does not have a large impact on tipping
dynamics. Policy-
wise it seems more important

to lower transmission rates than it does to limit
the number of growers in a vacuum. Having
more growers in a region, however, necessarily
decreases the average distance between fields
in that region, which would ultimately increase
transmission rates.
Cost-Benefit Ranges

The quotient R is the distribution of grower’s
benefit-cost ratio of adopting non-CBD within a
B
=
R pdf
=
( C ) e (i 1, f. N), where N is the
network:
total number of growers within a network. These
benefits and costs contain objective values such
as price and yield that can both vary across time
and region. They also contain subjective values for
B
how a given agent values risk. A high value for C
implies a given grower views farming fiber relatively favorably compared to farming CBD and will
switch to fiber even when pollination is unlikely.
A low value for R implies a given grower views
farming fiber relatively unfavorably compared to
farming CBD and will switch to fiber only when
cross-pollination is very likely. The distribution R
for growers within the network is uniformly distributed between 0 and RMax. RMax is the maximum
B
ratio possible of C for all growers included in a
i

i

i

i

i

i
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Figure 3. Tipping point and steady state for varying levels of Bmax in the benefit-cost ratio of
switching to fiber.
network. Networks with a high RMax will, on average, view non-CBD farming more favorably than
networks with lower RMax. In a network of risk-
neutral farmers and favorable expected profits for
CBD versus non-CBD, relatively low RMax values
make sense. In a network of highly risk-adverse
farmers and expected CBD profits only slightly
higher than non-CBD, higher RMax values make
sense.
Figure 3 shows the magnitude that expected
benefit cost ratios have on tipping and steady
state decisions. Curves denote uniform distributional assumptions that go from 0 to RMax. Higher
values of RMax are indicative of higher expected
benefit/cost ratios of switching to non-CBD production. From Figure 3, we can observe that the
more favorable growing non-CBD hemp is relative
to CBD, the earlier tips occur and the higher the
level of the resulting steady state. What is more
surprising is how high RMax must be to induce a
tip under our baseline assumptions of b = 0.50 and
B
dmax = 20. Recall that Ri = C for grower i, where Bi
denotes the benefit to growing non-CBD plus the
i

i

avoided externality cost of not growing CBD—if
the crop is cross-pollinated. However, CBD crops
are not cross-
pollinated with 100% certainty,
which is why we include parameters g = ad bm0 to
denote how likely cross-pollination is. A g below
100% ultimately scales down Bi. This means that
as long as cross-pollination is sufficiently unlikely
or the damage to cross-pollination is low, a tip is
unlikely to occur. This highlights the importance
of developing CBD cultivars that are resistant to
cross-pollination.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
When viewing our problem through the lens of
diffusion on social networks, we notice one primary problem and four potential solutions. The
problem is new farmers keep entering the hemp
industry. This both increases d and strengthens the
effect of g, which makes producing CBD hemp
less attractive. The effect of g grows as the entry
of additional hemp producers within a network
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decreases the distance between neighbors and
increases the likelihood of at least one non-CBD
neighbor’s crop reaching reproductive maturity at
the same time as the CBD crop. This will eventually
tip the industry from CBD hemp to fiber or seed
hemp. Such an outcome is problematic, given that,
at present, the estimated per acre revenue from
CBD hemp production, absent cross-pollination,
is many times the expected per acre revenue from
fiber or seed production.
Policy makers could address this by capping
the amount of permits available for fiber and seed
and auctioning them. This would increase the cost
of growing non-CBD, Ci, limit how large mi could
become, and limit the strength g (by increasing
b) since fewer hemp producers would increase
the average distance between each neighbor. This
policy is attractive as it simultaneously targets the
primitive with the largest effect on tipping (pollen transmission rates), while making it possible
to constrain the percentage of non-CBD producers below the X *0 associated with a given level of
bmax, Rmax, and b.
Additionally, legislators could require fiber and
seed producers to erect natural barriers such as a
row of trees. This would simultaneously increase
the cost of growing fiber, Ci, and reduce the strength
of g. Windbreaks and other thick crops at the border of a field were estimated to reduce maize pollen dispersal between 30% and 60% (Ushiyama
et al., 2009) and may also be efficient solutions
in the context of hemp. Windbreaks would limit
the strength of g by making cross-pollination less
likely. The advantage to windbreaks is that they
would degrade externality cost without additional
regulation and would enhance biodiversity in the
locales that implement them. The drawback to
windbreaks is that they would likely be costly
to implement both in terms of planting cost and
reduced acreage available for growing crops.
Agricultural zoning laws that geographically
separate CBD and non-
CBD production would
reduce the proportion of CBD growers’ neighbors
growing fiber mi, and the strength of g. The strength
of g is reduced by increasing distance between CBD
producers and their non-CBD producing neighbors. Cross-pollination from a non-CBD producer
is more likely if they are ¼ mile away than if they
are 2 miles away. This could be problematic as it
would not allow growers to self-select into what

crop they would prefer to grow, since their land is
in a fixed location.
Temporal zoning laws that separate when CBD
and fiber planting occur could reduce the probability of the negative externality occurring by
staggering plant reproductive cycles. Temporal
zoning laws reduce the strength of g which ultimately diminishes the effect of increases in di or
mi. Temporal zoning is an attractive possibility as
it limits the probability of cross-pollination without passing on any large cost to growers. Most
growers currently grow hemp as a supplemental crop and not their sole crop. The thought is
that farmers could redirect their time when they
are not allowed to plant hemp to get their other
crops established, freeing up time for when they
can legally plant hemp. This would be less true if
they were only growing hemp crops. These alternative policies can make the switch to non-CBD
less attractive, subsequently pushing the hemp
industry away from the tipping point and protecting CBD producers.
The hemp industry is currently developing in a
way that would encourage a tip to zero CBD (or
near zero) production. General increases in the
number of hemp farmers—and specifically increases
in grain and fiber hemp farmers—
contribute to
increasing the negative network externality passed
on to CBD growers. In the absence of policy to
correct this, the industrial hemp market may tip to
a new suboptimal Nash equilibrium where only/
mostly fiber and grain hemp are grown, thereby
decreasing farm-level income. Of the policy prescriptions considered, an auction for non-
CBD
production and intertemporal spacing appear to
be the two with the most potential for preventing a tip to high non-CBD production. Auctioning
rights to producing a good with a negative externality is a classic way of efficiently addressing the
externality as it establishes property rights on the
environmental amenity being degraded, in this
case pollen levels in the air. Non-CBD producers
would be forced to internalize the cost of their
externality by paying for the right to emit pollen. This policy would increase distance between
neighbors (decrease the strength of g by increasing b), increase the cost of producing non-CBD C,
and decrease mi by legally capping the number of
growers who can produce non-CBD crops. Intertemporal spacing would likely be effective as well,

40

McCarty and Young / Journal of Applied Farm Economics 3, no. 2 (Fall 2020)

as it would reduce transmission rates. Recall that
transmission rate by far had the strongest effect
on tipping. Targeting this through intertemporal
spacing of various hemp crops could dramatically
reduce the social externality cost without passing any large cost onto growers. It may also be
more politically feasible than some of the other
options presented due to its low cost and relative
light-handedness.
We offer three closing observations. First, the
relevance of the work herein is without question.
The proportion of hemp acres dedicated to CBD
production was likely over 90% in 2019—and
some argued higher still. For instance, Hemp
Industry Daily estimates as much as 98% of acres
in multiple regions to be planted for CBD (Drotleff, 2019). This proportion was anticipated to be,
by some estimates, near 70% in 2020 (Sumner,
2020). While the chief cause of this decline is not
immediately clear, at least two implications are:
the vast majority of acres are still devoted to CBD,
but there is an increase in acres of non-CBD production. This could be an indication of regional
instances of tipping—the outcome suggested in
this paper—or it simply could be a direct result of
lower expected prices for CBD biomass after the
glut experienced in 2019. In any case, the risk of
cross-pollination has not decreased with this shift
(it likely has grown). The second closing observation is that the ability to quantify policy impacts
is currently limited because of present issues with
data availability. Moreover, to do this is beyond
the scope of the work herein, but is nonetheless
a necessary undertaking and an inviting opportunity for future research. Finally, network effects
of cross-pollination are not simply an academic
problem. Cross-
pollination caused major lawsuits over intellectual property in the early 2000s
when Monsanto’s Roundup-ready gene corn crops
cross-pollinated neighboring fields that were growing corn from traditional seed. More recently, the
marijuana industry has grappled with this same
issue in the states that have legalized its production (Borque, 2019). Specifically, cross-pollination
from other hemp crops degrades THC levels in
marijuana. Our empirical specification of Jackson
and Yariv’s model could be applied to these types
of agricultural applications as well.

NOTE
The form of Equation (6) is associated with uniform
distribution of R occurring from 0 to Rmax. For a more
general form and detailed discussion of diffusion process modeling see Jackson and Yariv (2006).
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